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Abstract—In this paper, we deal with a coordination game
in a network where a player can choose both an action of
the game and partners for playing the game. In particular,
a player interacts with players connecting through a path con-
sisting of multiple links as well as with players directly con-
necting by a single link. We represent decay or friction of
payoffs with distance as communication costs, and examine
the effect of the communication cost on behavior of players
in the game and network formation. We investigate proper-
ties of equilibrium networks by classifying the link cost and
the communication cost, and show diversity of the equilibrium
networks.
Keywords—communication costs, coordination games, equilib-
rium, networks.
1. Introduction
Studies on formation of social systems and conventions
have been accumulated by mathematically modeling social
interaction between individuals through sequences of play-
ing a game. In such game theoretic approaches, interaction
between individuals is represented as playing coordination
games, and selection of equilibria is considered in a dy-
namic process with perturbations or mutations. Recently,
several articles have been devoted to similar attempts in
network environments by allowing players to choose part-
ners for playing the game as well as actions in the game [1],
[2], [3], and our concern is also to consider this topic.
To examine formulation of conventions, Kandori et al. [4]
and Young [5] deal with 2× 2 coordination games which
are repeatedly played by randomly matched pairs of play-
ers in a population. Ellison [6], Droste et al. [7], and Fa-
giolo [8] focus on locality of interaction between play-
ers. Oechssler [9], Ely [10], and Bhaskar and Vega-
Redondo [11] consider location models where the popu-
lation is divided into several groups and players choose
which group to join. In the recent years, similar attempts
in network environments have been attracting attention [1],
[2], [3]. In such models, players are allowed to choose part-
ners for playing the game as well as actions in the game. It
should be noted that the network game models are related
with studies on formation of networks [12], [13], [14].
Assuming that the link formation can be realized by an uni-
lateral decision of a player and the player pays all the link
cost, Goyal and Vega-Redondo [2] define Nash equilibrium
networks, and consider stability of networks in the long run.
For the case where interaction is restricted to a pair of two
players connected by a direct link, they show the following
result. For games where two players can obtain positive
payoffs even in disequilibrium, the completely connected
network is in equilibrium, and when the link cost is higher
than the level of the payoff, networks with two completely
connected components and the empty network are also in
equilibrium. For the stability in the long run, if the link cost
is smaller than a certain threshold, the risk dominant equi-
librium networks are stochastically stable, and if the link
cost is larger than it, the payoff dominant equilibrium net-
works are stochastically stable. Furthermore, they consider
a network game model where any two players without a di-
rect link are allowed to interact through two or more links
connecting them. In this setting, they find that the unique
stochastically stable structure of networks is a minimally
connected network called a center-sponsored star network,
and also find that there exists a certain threshold dividing
two types of coordination: the risk dominant and the payoff
dominant actions.
A study of Hojman and Szeidl [3] deals with a network
game model with directed links similar to that of Goyal
and Vega-Redondo [2]. In their model, it is assumed that
interaction between two players connected not only by a sin-
gle link but also by a path of multiple links is allowed,
but a player can obtain payoffs only from interaction with
other players to whom there are directed paths of links.
They show that the structure of Nash equilibrium networks
is wheel-shaped. For the long run stability, when the link
cost is small and the disequilibrium payoff is positive, the
risk dominant equilibrium is a unique stochastic stable net-
work, and otherwise the payoff dominant equilibrium is
uniquely stochastically stable on the condition that the pay-
off dominant equilibrium creates quite high positive gain
or the degree of the risk dominance is small.
Although Goyal and Vega-Redondo [2] and Hojman and
Szeidl [3] deal with interaction through a path, i.e., multiple
consecutive links connecting players, it is assumed that the
interaction between players connected by a path does not
require any communication cost or such interaction is fric-
tionless. However, it is natural to think that interaction with
distant players costs and/or takes time much more than in-
teraction between directly connected players. In this paper,
we assume that a payoff arising from interaction through
a path decreases with distance. This can be represented by
a discount of the payoff or a communication cost of the
network. While a discounted payoff is always nonnegative,
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the payoff from which the communication cost is subtracted
may be negative. In this paper, employing a representation
of decreasing the payoff by the communication cost, we
deal with a network game model with interaction between
distant players. Assuming that a link between two players
is formed or maintained if the payoffs of both players do
not decrease and they equally pay the link cost, we examine
equilibrium networks. In Section 2, we introduce a network
game model with the communication costs, and the equi-
librium networks are shown in Section 3. Some concluding
remarks are given in Section 4.
2. A Model
We deal with a network game model where a player chooses
partners for interacting through direct links or paths consist-
ing of multiple consecutive links. The interaction through
a path requires the communication cost which increases
with a distance between two players.
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be the set of players which is called
a population. The interaction between two players is rep-
resented by a 2× 2 coordination game shown in Table 1.
Let ai ∈ {α,β} denote an action selected by player i. Each
entry of the payoff table is a 2-dimensional vector and, the
first element of the vector is a payoff of the row player
and the second one is that of the column player. A vec-
tor a = {a1, . . . ,an} of actions selected by all the players is
called a profile of actions.
Table 1
Payoff table of a coordination game
Row player
Column player
α β
α (a,a) ( f ,e)
β (e, f ) (b,b)
Because we deal with a coordination game with conflict
between the risk dominant equilibrium and the payoff dom-
inant equilibrium, it is assumed that the following condi-
tions are satisfied for the parameters of the payoffs given
in Table 1.
a > b, a > e, b > f , a + f < b + e. (1)
Thus, the outcome (α,α) is the payoff dominant equilib-
rium, and (β ,β ) is the risk dominant equilibrium.
The following notation is used. If there exists link i j
between players i and j, li j = 1, and otherwise li j = 0.
A set of links of player i is expressed by li = (li1, . . . , li,i−1,
li,i+1, . . . , li,n) ∈ {0,1}n−1. Because player i can decide to
choose which links to maintain, the link set li of player i
can be interpreted as a strategy for choices of links. A vec-
tor l = (l1, . . . , ln) of link sets of all the players is a profile
of links, and a set of links in the population is expressed
by g(l) = {i j | li j = l ji = 1}.
If li j = 1 or there exist a series of players j1, . . . , jm such
that li j1 = · · · = l jk jk+1 = · · · = l jm j = 1, it is said that there
exists a path between players i and j. The existence of the
path is denoted by ¯li j = 1, and the path is also expressed
by i ↔ j. A set of paths of player i is expressed by ¯li =
(¯li1, . . . , ¯li,i−1, ¯li,i+1, . . . , ¯lin). For a path i ↔ j, the length of
the path or the distance between players i and j is defined
as the minimal number of links connecting i and j, and it
is denoted by Li j. A set of nodes corresponding to g(l) is
expressed by N(g(l)) = {i | ∃ j, i j ∈ g(l)}. For a subset of
links g(l′) ⊂ g(l), g(l′) is called a component of g(l) if,
for any pair of i ∈ N(g(l′)) and j ∈ N(g(l′)), there exists
a path i ↔ j, and i j ∈ g(l) implies i j ∈ g(l′).
To form or maintain link i j, players i and j need to pay the
cost c. When there exits a path between players i and j,
i.e., ¯li j = 1, they play the 2× 2 coordination game paying
the communication cost d(Li j), where d(·) is a strictly in-
creasing monotone function with the length of the path,
and d(1) = 0. It is assumed that player i takes the same
action ai for all games with partners connected by direct
links or paths. Let a−i = (a1, . . . ,ai−1,ai+1, . . . ,an) and
l−i = (l1, . . . , li−1, li+1, . . . , ln) be, respectively, a profile of
actions and a profile of links for N−i = N \{i} which is the
set of players except for player i. Then, a utility of player
i with a strategy (ai, li) is written by
pii((ai, li),(a−i, l−i)) =∑
j: ¯li j=1
u(ai,a j)−∑
j:li j=1
c−∑
j: ¯li j=1
d(Li j), (2)
where u(ai,a j) is player i’s payoff of the game shown in
Table 1 when player i chooses action ai ∈ {α,β} and player
j chooses action a j ∈ {α,β}. For concise representation,
the part of costs in (2) is defined by
Di = ∑
j:li j=1
c +∑
j: ¯li j=1
d(Li j). (3)
Let A, {α,β} and L, {0,1}n−1 denote the strategy sets of
actions and links, respectively. The strategy set of a player
is represented by X , A×L. A strategy of player i is rep-
resented by a pair of an action and a set of links, and it is
denoted by si = (ai, li)∈ X , ai ∈ A, li ∈ L. A strategy profile
s = (s1,s2, . . . ,sn)∈ Xn of all the players indicates a state of
the network, and we call a strategy profile s a network or
a state. We assume that each of the players knows a state s
and can calculate the utilities of the other players pi j(s),
j 6= i as well as the utility pii(s) of self. Moreover, we as-
sume that link i j is formed only if both of the utilities of
i and j do not decrease by forming link i j. Namely, when
player i is selected to revise a strategy, for any player j such
that li j = l ji = 0 at the state s before revising the strategy
of i and li j = l ji = 1 at the state s′ after revising it, the
condition pi j(s′) ≥ pi j(s) must be satisfied. It is said that
the strategy s′i of player i is feasible if this condition is sat-
isfied, and a set of feasible strategies of player i is denoted
by Xi ⊂ X . It follows that player i chooses a strategy s′i
among the feasible strategy set Xi, i.e., s′i ∈ Xi. Because we
assume that each player always chooses a strategy among
the feasible strategy set, Nash equilibrium networks can be
defined as follows.
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Definition 1: A state sˆ = (sˆ1, . . . , sˆn) is said to be an equi-
librium state or an equilibrium network if, for any player
i ∈ N and any feasible strategy si ∈ Xi, the following con-
dition holds:
pii(sˆi, sˆ−i) ≥ pii(si, sˆ−i). (4)
Such a strategy sˆi = (aˆi, ˆli) is called an equilibrium strategy
of player i, and a component in an equilibrium network is
called an equilibrium component.
In this paper, focusing on actions of players and the for-
mation of links, we examine static equilibrium networks
in the network game with the communication cost. At the
beginning of the examination, we give some definitions
on actions of players and structures of networks. We call
a player who chooses action α an α-player, and a player
who chooses action β a β -player. A player holding only
one link is called a leaf player, and a player holding no link
is called an isolated player. If all of players who belong
to a component g(l′) choose action α , the component g(l′)
is called an α-component, and similarly a β -component is
defined. If any pairs of players i, j ∈N(g(l′)) are connected
by a direct link, i.e., l′i j = l′ji = 1, the component g(l′) is
said to be completely connected. If a component is divided
by severing any link in the component, the component is
said to be minimally connected. If after severing a ceratin
link in a component, the component is not divided, there
should exist a loop of links in the component. A compo-
nent without any leaf player is called a leafless component.
In particular, if all the players in a component have only
two links and they are arranged like a circle, the compo-
nent is called a ring component. These definitions are given
for components, and similar definitions are also given for
networks.
3. Equilibrium Networks
We deal with coordination games in network environments
and examine equilibria of networks in this section. If an
equilibrium network is not the empty network, there ex-
ists at least one component. Then, we first characterize
equilibrium components.
Lemma 1: In any equilibrium component, all the players
in the component choose the same action.
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix, and the proofs
of the subsequent lemmata and theorem are also given in
Appendix. While we focused on behavior of players in
Lemma 1, the next lemma deals with structures of equi-
librium components. Let C and |C| denote a component
and the number of players in the component, respectively.
As shown in Lemma 1, all players choose the same ac-
tion in an equilibrium component, and let the action be
x ∈ A = {α,β}. First, we consider the case where the link
cost is smaller than the payoff obtained by coordination of
choices, i.e., c < u(x,x). Let L denote a distance between
players i and j, and let k denote any player on path i ↔ j.
Because a distance between players i and k decreases or
does not change when link i j is formed, the sum of the
communication costs over path i ↔ j decreases, and the
reduced cost is calculated as follows:
RC(L) =
L
∑
k=⌈L/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k), (5)
where ⌈x⌉ and ⌊x⌋ mean the minimal integer larger than or
equal to x and the maximal integer smaller than or equal
to x, respectively.
Lemma 2: For a given action x∈A = {α,β}, if c < u(x,x),
an equilibrium x-componentC has the following structures.
(1) If c < d(2), an equilibrium component is completely
connected, and vice versa.
(2) If d(2) ≤ c and c ≤ RC(|C| − 1), there exists an
equilibrium component which is not completely con-
nected. The maximal length of a path in the equi-
librium component is the largest number L satisfying
RC(L) ≤ c and L < |C|.
(3) If d(2)≤ c and RC(|C|−1)< c, an equilibrium com-
ponent is minimally connected.
From b < a, c < u(β ,β ) implies c < u(α,α). Then, the
result of Lemma 2 is valid for α- and β -components if
c < b, it is valid for α-components if b < c < a, and it is
not valid for either of them if a < c.
For (3) of Lemma 2, any minimally connected component
is not always an equilibrium component. As a counterex-
ample, consider a component where 4 players are in line.
From |C| = 4 and the condition of (3) of Lemma 2, the
inequality c > d(3)−d(2) holds. The utility of player i at
the end of the line is pii = 3u(x,x)− c− d(2)− d(3), and
from c > d(3)−d(2), it satisfies the following inequality.
pii = 3u(x,x)− c−d(2)−d(3)
< 3u(x,x)− (d(3)−d(2))−d(2)−d(3)
= 3u(x,x)−2d(3).
Then, the utility pii of player i is negative when 3u(x,x)−
2d(3) < 0. For example, when c = 4.5,u(x, x) = 5,
d(2) = 4,d(3) = 8, because the condition of Lemma 2:
d(2) ≤ c < u(x,x) and d(3)−d(2) < c and the above con-
dition: 3u(x,x)− 2d(3) < 0 are satisfied, the utility pii of
player i is negative. Thus, the best response of player i is
to sever the link, and it follows that the component is not
an equilibrium component.
We also show an example of a minimally connected compo-
nent which is an equilibrium component. Consider a star-
shaped minimally connected component where player 1 is
the center and players 2, 3, and 4 are peripheries. Because
a distance between any pair of players is at most two and
d(2)≤ c, a new link is never formed. From c < u(x,x), the
utility of player 1, pi1 = 3(u(x,x)−c), is positive, and those
of the other players, pi2 = pi3 = pi4 = 3u(x,x)− c− 2d(2),
are positive. When any link is severed, the utility of player
1 decreases by u(x,x)−c. At this moment, the counterpart
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is isolated and her utility becomes zero. Thus, because in
the star-shaped component, a new link is not formed and
any of the existing links is not severed, it is an equilibrium
component.
In Lemma 2, we have considered the structure of compo-
nents, and in the next lemma, we examine whether or not
there exist multiple components in an equilibrium network.
Lemma 3: For a given action x ∈ A = {α,β}, if c <
u(x,x), in an equilibrium network, there exists only one x-
component, and any x-player is connected with some other
player.
Next, we consider the case where the link cost is larger
than the payoff obtained by coordination of choices, i.e.,
c > u(x,x). In general, an x-component is not likely to
be formed in this case, but it could be maintained because
players can obtain a positive payoff arising from interaction
between distant players through paths if the communication
cost is relatively small.
Lemma 4: For a given action x∈ A = {α,β}, if c > u(x,x),
in an equilibrium network, the necessary condition for
existing one or more x-components is that the condition
d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(2l) is satisfied, and there exists an integer
l ∈ (1,n/2] satisfying the condition
c−u(x,x)≤ (l−1)u(x,x)−
l
∑
k=1
d(k). (6)
Moreover, such equilibrium x-components are leafless.
From the above discussion, we have the following results.
Theorem 1: Assuming that the communication cost d(·) is
a strictly increasing monotone function with a distance be-
tween any pair of players, we can characterize equilibrium
networks as follows.
(1) In the case of c < b:
(a) If c < d(2), an equilibrium network is the com-
pletely connected α-network or the completely
connected β -network.
(b) If d(2) ≤ c and c ≤ RC(n − 1), an equilib-
rium network is an incompletely connected
α-network or an incompletely connected β -net-
work. The maximal length of a path in the equi-
librium network is the largest number L satis-
fying the conditions RC(L) ≤ c and L < |C|.
(c) If d(2) ≤ c and c > RC(n− 1), an equilibrium
network is a minimally connected α-network
or a minimally connected β -network.
(2) In the case of b < c < a:
(a) If c < d(2), an equilibrium network is a com-
pletely connected α-network or an empty
β -network.
(b) If d(2) ≤ c and c ≤ RC(n − 1), an equilib-
rium network is an incompletely connected
α-network or an empty β -network. Moreover,
if there exists an integer l ∈ (1,n/2] satisfying
the condition c−b≤ (l−1)b−∑lk=1 d(k), a net-
work with one or more leafless β -components
can be an equilibrium network, and it may in-
clude one α-component. The maximal length
of a path in the equilibrium network is the
largest number L satisfying the conditions
RC(L) ≤ c and L < |C|.
(c) If d(2) ≤ c and c > RC(n− 1), an equilibrium
network is a minimally connected α-network or
an empty β -network.
(3) In the case of a < c:
(a) If c < d(2), an equilibrium network is an empty
network.
(b) If d(2) ≤ c and c ≤ RC(n − 1), an equilib-
rium network is an empty network. Moreover, if
there exists an integer la ∈ (1,n/2] satisfying the
condition c− a ≤ (la − 1)a−∑lak=1 d(k), a net-
work with one or more leafless α-components
can be an equilibrium network; and if there ex-
ists an integer lb ∈ (1,n/2] satisfying the con-
dition c−b ≤ (lb −1)b−∑lbk=1 d(k), a network
with one or more leafless β -components can be
an equilibrium network.
(c) If d(2) ≤ c and c > RC(n− 1), an equilibrium
network is an empty network.
The structures of equilibrium networks shown in Theorem
1 are summarized in Table 2. In Theorem 1, the structures
of equilibrium networks are characterized by the relation
between the link cost c and the communication cost d(2)
of distance 2. In general, when the link cost c is smaller
than the payoff of the game such as the payoff dominant
equilibrium payoff a and the risk dominant equilibrium pay-
off b, a link is formed. Moreover, when the communication
cost d(·) is large, compared to the link cost c, a link be-
tween any pair of players is likely to be formed, and when
the communication cost d(·) is small, the number of links
decreases because not direct links but paths allow players to
interact with other players at lower costs. Moreover, com-
paring the link cost c and the communication cost d(2)
of distance 2 reveals whether or not players should form
a link. By analysis taking into account the communication
cost of distances larger than 2, we can examine the length
of a path in a network.
In (1) of Theorem 1, because the link cost c is smaller than
the payoff b of the risk dominant equilibrium, an equi-
librium network is either an α-network which means the
risk dominant equilibrium or a β -network which means
the payoff dominant equilibrium. For the case of (a), be-
cause interaction by using direct links is profitable due to
c < d(2), the completely connected network is formed. In
the case of (c), interaction by using direct links is costly
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Table 2
Equilibrium networks
Case Condition (1) c < b (2) b < c < a (3) a < c
(a) c < d(2) complete α complete α empty
complete β empty β
(b) d(2)≤ c incomplete α incomplete α empty
c ≤ RC(n−1) incomplete β empty β (leafless α)
(leafless β ) (leafless β )
(c) d(2)≤ c minimal α minimal α empty
c > RC(n−1) minimal β empty β
(leafless α) or (leafless β ) is conditional.
compared to interaction through paths because of d(2)≤ c,
and from c > RC(n−1), any loop is not formed. Thus, an
equilibrium network is minimally connected.
Fig. 1. A minimally connected (star) network.
As an example of a minimally connected network, a star-
shaped network is given in Fig. 1. In this network, a new
link between players of two units of distance is not formed
because forming such links results in decrease of the utili-
ties of the players. Moreover, any existing link is not sev-
ered because by severing a link the utilities of two players
decrease by at least b− c. Thus, this type of networks are
in equilibrium.
In the case of (b), because of d(2)≤ c and c ≤ RC(n−1),
an equilibrium network is not completely connected but it
includes a loop. The density of networks, i.e., the number
of links depends on the relation between the link cost c and
the communication cost d(·), and it can be characterized
by the maximal length of paths.
An example of an incompletely connected equilibrium net-
work is given in Fig. 2. The length of a path in this net-
work is at most 3, and if max{d(2),RC(3)} ≤ c, a new
Fig. 2. An incomplete network.
link is not formed. Because severing any link in the loop
makes a pair of players of 4 units of distance, the utili-
ties of them decrease by severing the link if c < RC(4).
For example, let d(k) = k. Then, from RC(3) = 1 and
RC(4) = 5, this network is an equilibrium network if
2 ≤ c < 5. On the other hand, the condition of Theorem
1, d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(8), can be written as 2 ≤ c ≤ 16. Then,
when c = 2,3,4, both of the equilibrium condition of this
network, max{2,RC(3)} ≤ c < RC(4), and the condition
of Theorem 1, d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(8), are satisfied simultane-
ously. With the above mentioned parameters, the incom-
pletely connected network given in Fig. 2 is an equilibrium
network.
In (2) of Theorem 1, because the link cost c is larger
than the payoff b of the risk dominant equilibrium and it
is smaller than the payoff a of the payoff dominant equi-
librium, it is supposed that an equilibrium network is an
α-network but a β -network is not the case. However, it is
shown that if the condition given in the theorem is satis-
fied, some β -network can be an equilibrium. For the case
of (a), from c < d(2), the completely connected network is
formed when all the players choose action α , and as a spe-
cial case, a state where all the players choose action β in
the empty network is an equilibrium network. In the case
of (c), because interaction by using direct links is costly
compared to interaction through paths for the same reason
as in (1), a minimally connected equilibrium α-network is
formed. The empty β -network is also an equilibrium. In
the case of (b), because of d(2)≤ c and c ≤ RC(n−1), an
equilibrium network is not completely connected. More-
over, as special structures of equilibrium networks, besides
the empty β -network, networks with one or more leafless
β -components and networks with one α-component and
one or more leafless β -components can be equilibria. How-
ever, an equilibrium network with a β -component can exist
only when the condition given in the theorem is satisfied.
Even if the link cost c is larger than the payoff b of the
game, the utilities of players may become positive because
of interaction between distant players, and then leafless
β -components can be included in an equilibrium net-
work. It is noted that there does not exist a leaf player in
a β -component because the utility of a player who shares
a link with the leaf player increases by severing the link.
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We give some examples of equilibrium networks with mul-
tiple components in Figs. 3 and 4. In a network shown
in Fig. 3, assume that the payoffs of the game are set at
a = 11, b = 6.71, e = 1, and f = 0, and the costs of the
link and the communication are set at c = 10, d(2) = 5,
d(3) = 5.1, and d(4) = 20, respectively.
Fig. 3. A network with two β -components.
In Fig. 3, a β -network with two β -components is given.
Forming a link within a component results in decrease of
the utility, and therefore a new link within a component is
not formed. Because by severing a link the distance be-
tween players becomes more than or equal to 4 and then
the cost of a player increases, any link is not severed. Next,
consider formation of a link between components. Because
the utilities of players decrease by forming a link connect-
ing two players in different components, a link between
two components is not formed. In the case where links
within a component and between components are formed
simultaneously, no player is better off. Moreover, by mov-
ing to the other component, the utility of any player does
not increase. Thus, the network with two β -components in
Fig. 3 is an equilibrium network.
A network with coexistence of an α-component and
a β -component is shown in Fig. 4. Let the payoffs of the
game be a = 8, b = 6, e = 1, and f = 0, and suppose that the
costs of the link and the communication are c = 7, d(2) = 3,
d(3) = 4, and d(4) = 12. With these parameter values, by
a similar consideration, one finds that the network with
coexistence of an α-component and a β -components in
Fig. 4 is an equilibrium network.
Fig. 4. A network with α- and β -components.
In (3) of Theorem 1, because of c > a, an equilibrium net-
work is generally an empty network where the actions of
players are unspecified. However, if d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(n−1)
is satisfied, a leafless component can be included in an
equilibrium network. In the case of (a), from c < d(2), one
finds that there does not exist an integer l satisfying the
condition (6) in Lemma 4 because the left hand side of (6)
is negative, and then only the empty networks are equilib-
ria. For the case of (c), similarly, the condition of Lemma
4 is not satisfied due to c > RC(n−1), and then there does
not exist any nonempty equilibrium network. In contrast,
in the case of (b), from d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(n− 1), if play-
ers can obtain larger payoffs from the interaction between
distant players through paths, besides the empty equilib-
rium networks, there can exist an equilibrium network with
a leafless component.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we dealt with the network game model in
which a player can choose partners for playing the under-
lying coordination games as well as an action of the game,
assuming that interaction between distant players is possi-
ble, but it requires the payment of the communication cost.
We examined influence of the communication cost on the
behavior of players in the game and the structure of net-
works. We showed a diversity of the equilibrium networks.
The relevant studies [1], [2], [3] examine the long-run
stability of the equilibrium networks. Naturally, it is
interesting to investigate the stability of the equilibrium
networks in the network game model considered in this
paper, and we will intend to deal with this topic.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that a component with α-players and β -players is
an equilibrium component, and let nα and nβ denote the
numbers of α-players and β -players, respectively. Then,
the utility of α-player i defined by (2) is expressed by
piαi =
{
(nα −1)u(α,α)+ nβ u(α,β )
}
−Di , (7)
where Di is the total cost defined by (3). Assume that
player i changes his action of the game from α to β , and
let piβi denote the utility of player i at the time. Because
the structure of the component is the same as before, Di
does not change, and then the utility piβi is expressed by
pi
β
i =
{
(nα −1)u(β ,α)+ nβu(β ,β )
}
−Di . (8)
Because the component is in equilibrium before player
i changes his action, the inequality piαi ≥ pi
β
i holds, and
from Eqs. (7) and (8), one finds that
(nα −1)a + nβ f ≥ (nα −1)e + nβb . (9)
Similarly, for β -player j in the component, the following
inequality holds.
nα e +(nβ −1)b ≥ nαa +(nβ −1) f . (10)
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From Ineqs. (9) and (10), one finds that
−(b− f )≥ a− e . (11)
Because the inequality (11) is inconsistent with the assump-
tion (1) of the payoffs of the game, a > e and b > f , the
component with α-players and β -players is not an equilib-
rium component. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Let L be the distance between players i and j, i.e, Li j = L,
2 ≤ L < |C|. First, we show the condition that link i j is
not formed. The total cost of player i for path i ↔ j is
calculated as follows:
c +
L
∑
k=1
d(k) . (12)
If link i j is formed, i.e., li j = 1, the total cost of player
i changes to
c +
⌈L/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+ c . (13)
Thus, if the cost (13) after link i j is formed is larger than
the original cost (12), i.e.,
c ≥
L
∑
k=⌈L/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k) , (14)
then link i j is not formed.
To prove (1), assume that an equilibrium component is not
completely connected. Then, there exists at least one pair of
players i and j such that Li j ≥ 2. In this case, because link
i j is not formed, the condition (14) is satisfied. When L = 2,
one finds that c≥ d(2)−d(1) = d(2), which is inconsistent
with the assumption of (i): c < d(2). Thus, if there exists an
equilibrium network, its component should be completely
connected.
Consider a completely connected component. The utility
of player i arising from the interaction with player j is
u(x,x)− c−d(1). Then, if link i j is severed, the utility of
player i changes to u(x,x)−d(2). Because, from d(1) = 0
and c < d(2), severing link i j results in decrease of the util-
ity, the completely connected component is an equilibrium
component.
Consider the case of (3) before the case of (2), and assume
that there exists an equilibrium component with a loop con-
sisting of L players. Let i and j be adjacent players in the
loop. Because of the assumption of equilibrium, severing
link i j results in increase of the cost, and one finds that the
following inequality holds:
2c +
⌈L/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k) ≤ c +
L
∑
k=1
d(k) .
Namely, we have
c ≤
L
∑
k=⌈L/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k) = RC(L) . (15)
Because d(·) is a strictly monotone increasing function and
the right hand side of (15) is at most RC(|C|−1), for any
L < |C|, the inequality (15) is inconsistent with the assump-
tion of (3): c > RC(|C|−1). Thus, there does not exist any
loop in an equilibrium component, and then it is a mini-
mally connected component.
Finally, for the case of (2), assume that an equilibrium com-
ponent is completely connected. Because severing a link
results in increase of the cost, it follows that 2c < c+d(2).
This is inconsistent with the assumption of (2): d(2) ≤ c,
and therefore an equilibrium component is not completely
connected. To show that an equilibrium component is
not restricted to be minimally connected, we demonstrate
that a ring shaped component can be an equilibrium com-
ponent.
Let C and |C| denote a ring shaped component and the
number of players in the component, respectively. First,
we give the condition that severing a link of player i results
in increase of the cost of player i. The total cost Di of
player i in the component is
Di = c +
⌈(|C|−1)/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊(|C|−1)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+ c . (16)
When player i severs a link, the total cost of player i changes
to
D−i = c +
(|C|−1)
∑
k=1
d(k) . (17)
Thus, the condition that severing a link of player i results
in increase of the cost of player i is Di < D−i , i.e.,
c <
|C|−1
∑
k=⌈(|C|−1)/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊(|C|−1)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k) . (18)
Second, consider the condition that forming a new link
results in increase of the cost. Let the distance between
players i and j be Li j = L. When player i is directly con-
nected with player j, two loops are formed; one loop has
L+1 players, and the other has |C|−L+1 players. At this
time, the cost of player i changes to
D+i = c +
⌈L/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+ c
+
⌈(|C|−L)/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊(|C|−L)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+ c . (19)
Thus, the condition that forming a new link of player i re-
sults in increase of the cost of player i is Di < D+i , i.e.,
c >
⌈(|C|−1)/2⌉
∑
k=⌈L/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)
+
⌊(|C|−1)/2⌋
∑
k=⌈(|C|−L)/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊(|C|−L)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k) . (20)
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Third, suppose that player i severs link i j and forms a new
link is, s 6= j, where Lis = L. At this time, the cost of player
i changes to
D−+i =
L
∑
k=1
d(k)+ c +
⌈(|C|−L)/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊(|C|−L)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+ c . (21)
Because d(·) is a strictly monotone increasing function, one
finds that D−+i < Di, namely, the cost of player i decreases
by this operation. As for the cost of player s, it is
D−+s = c+
L
∑
k=1
d(k)+c+
⌈(|C|−L)/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊(|C|−L)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+c , (22)
and therefore D+s < D−+s . Because if (20) is satisfied,
Ds < D+s < D−+s holds, player s rejects player i’s offer
to form link is. Therefore, if both Ineqs. (18) and (20)
are satisfied simultaneously, the ring shaped component C
is an equilibrium component. Moreover, because from the
proof of (1), if c < d(2), an equilibrium component is com-
pletely connected, d(2)≤ c should be also satisfied. Thus,
under the following condition, a component which includes
a loop but is not completely connected can be an equilib-
rium component.
max
{
d(2),
⌈(|C|−1)/2⌉
∑
k=⌈L/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊(|C|−1)/2⌋
∑
k=⌈(|C|−L)/2⌉+1
d(k)
−
⌊(|C|−L)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)
}
< c <
|C|−1
∑
k=⌈(|C|−1)/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊(|C|−1)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)
= RC(|C|−1) . (23)
As for the maximal length of a path, because (14) is the
condition that link i j is not formed when the distance be-
tween players i and j is L, the maximal length is derived
straightforwardly from the condition. 
Proof of Lemma 3
Assume that a network with two or more x-components is
in equilibrium, and select any two components C1 and C2
in them. Let |C1| and |C2| be the numbers of players in C1
and C2, respectively. Consider player i in C1 who selects
action ai and player j in C2 who selects action a j. If player
i severs all his links in C1, takes the same action as a j, and
offers to form a new link with player j in C2, then player
j accepts the offer because of u(a j,a j) > c, and therefore
any player can move another component.
For the case of c < d(2), because any component is com-
pletely connected, the condition that player i does not have
any incentive to move from C1 to C2 is as follows.
(|C1|−1)(u(ai,ai)− c)≥ |C2|(u(a j,a j)− c) . (24)
For player j, the following similar condition is obtained.
(|C2|−1)(u(a j,a j)− c)≥ |C1|(u(ai,ai)− c) . (25)
Thus, if the following inequality condition is satisfied, both
players do not move.
0 ≥ (u(ai,ai)− c)+ (u(a j,a j)− c)
However, because min{u(ai,ai),u(a j,a j)} > c, the above
inequality does not hold, and therefore in the case of c <
d(2) a network with two or more x-components is not an
equilibrium network.
For the case of c ≥ d(2), assume that player i forms a new
link with player k in C2 who has a link with player j. At
this time, the utility of player i is represented by
pii = |C2|u(a j,a j)− (D j + d(2)) ,
where D j denotes the total cost of player j. If the following
inequality condition is satisfied, player i does not have any
incentive to move from C1 to C2.
(|C1|−1)u(ai,ai)−Di ≥ |C2|u(a j,a j)−(D j + d(2)) . (26)
For player j, the following similar condition is obtained.
(|C2|−1)u(a j,a j)−D j ≥ |C1|u(ai,ai)−(Di + d(2)) . (27)
Thus, if the following inequality condition is satisfied, both
players do not move.
0 ≥ (u(ai,ai)−d(2))+ (u(a j,a j)−d(2)) .
However, this inequality is inconsistent with
min{u(ai,ai),u(a j,a j)} > c ≥ d(2), and therefore even
in the case of c ≥ d(2), a network with two or more
x-components is not an equilibrium network.
Finally, consider the case where there exists an isolated
x-player. Assume that player j, j 6= i, is in some compo-
nent C. Similarly to the cases of c < d(2) and c ≥ d(2),
the condition that player i is not willing to form any link is
expressed as follows.
0 ≥ |C|(u(a j,a j)− c), if c < d(2) , (28)
0 ≥ |C|u(a j,a j)− (D j + d(2)), if c ≥ d(2) . (29)
If the component C is an equilibrium component, the util-
ity pi j of player j is nonnegative, i.e.,
pi j = (|C|−1)(u(a j,a j)− c)≥ 0, if c < d(2) , (30)
pi j = (|C|−1)u(a j,a j)−D j ≥ 0, if c ≥ d(2) . (31)
Because (28) is inconsistent with (30), and (29) is
inconsistent with (31), a network with an x-component
and an isolated x-player is not an equilibrium. Moreover,
because u(a j,a j) > c, the empty network is also not an
equilibrium. Thus, by these facts, the lemma is proven.

Proof of Lemma 4
If player i is directly connected with a leaf player j,
the utility of player i increases by severing link i j be-
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cause c > u(x,x). Therefore, equilibrium x-components are
leafless, and it must include one or more loops.
When player i interacts with a player of distance L, the
condition that link i j is maintained is that c+∑Lk=1 d(k) ≤
Lu(x,x) holds. This condition is rewritten as
c−u(x,x)≤ (L−1)u(x,x)−
L
∑
k=1
d(k) ,
which is the same as condition (6) given in the lemma.
Condition (6) means that if the gain arising from the
interaction with distant players through a path is larger
than the loss, the link cost minus the payoff of the game,
of the interaction with an adjacent player directly con-
nected by a link, the link is maintained. Therefore, main-
taining an x-component requires all the players in the
component to satisfy condition (6). Because the length
of a path in a component is at most ⌊n/2⌋, if condition (6)
is satisfied for the length L ∈ (1,n/2] of a loop in an
x-component, the x-component can be equilibrium com-
ponent.
Next, we show that there can exist multiple x-components
in an equilibrium network. For sake of simplicity, consider
two ring shaped components with L + 1 players, and they
are denoted by C1 and C2. Let i and j be players in C1 and
C2, respectively. After link i j is formed, the variation of
the utility of player i is
(2L+ 1)u(x,x)− c−2
L+1
∑
k=1
d(k) . (32)
From condition (6), (2L+1)u(x,x)−c−2∑Lk=1 d(k) is pos-
itive. However, if d(L+1) is sufficiently large, (32) can be
negative and then forming link i j results in decrease of the
utility of player i. Then, a link between the two compo-
nents C1 and C2 is not formed.
In the other cases such as the case where player i offers
to form two or more links with players in C2, or the case
where player i offers to form two links with players in
C2 and one link with another player in C1, from a similar
discussion, one finds that it is possible that the utility of
player i decreases, and therefore, in an equilibrium network,
there can exist multiple leafless components.
Finally, we consider the condition with respect to the link
cost c such that there exists an integer l satisfying con-
dition (6). Because d(·) is a strictly monotone increasing
function, if the gain arising from the interaction with dis-
tant players through a path is positive, that is, the right hand
side of (6) is positive, it is necessary that u(x,x) > d(2).
If c < d(2), then from u(x,x) < c, one finds u(x,x) < d(2),
and there dose not exist an integer l satisfying condi-
tion (6). Therefore, d(2) ≤ c must be satisfied. When an
integer l satisfies condition (6), there exists a loop with
2l + 1 players choosing action x. In the loop, the cost of
any player i is 2(c + ∑lk=1 d(k)), and when player i sev-
ers a link, the cost changes to c + ∑2lk=1 d(k). Because
severing a link increases the cost of a player, the following
inequality must be satisfied:
c ≤
2l
∑
k=l+1
d(k)−
l
∑
k=1
d(k) = RC(2l) . (33)
Namely, to exist an x-component in an equilibrium
network, d(2)≤ c ≤ RC(2l) must be satisfied. 
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of (1): From Lemma 1, all the players in an equi-
librium component choose the same action: α or β . From
c < b and Lemma 3, there exists only one α-component or
one β -component. For both of the α-component and the
β -component, by Lemma 2, the structure of the equilibrium
network is determined as described in the theorem.
Proof of (2): Consider the empty β -network. Because
there exists no link between players, switching an action
from β to α does not change the payoff of a player. More-
over, because forming a link results in decrease of the
payoff of a player by b− c, such a link is not formed.
Thus, any player does not have any incentive to change
his strategy, and then the β -network can be an equilibrium
network.
As for nonempty networks, from Lemma 1, all the play-
ers in an equilibrium component choose the same action:
α or β . From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, by setting x = α ,
one draws the conclusions of (a), (b), and (c) for α-
networks, and from Lemma 4, by setting x = β , one draws
the conclusion of (b) for β -networks. In the following, we
will prove that a network with both of an α-component and
a β -component can be an equilibrium in (b).
Because d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(n − 1) in (b), from Lemma 4,
a β -component can be an equilibrium component. Con-
sider the condition that in an equilibrium network, an
α-component with m (≥ 2) players coexists with a ring
shaped β -component with 2L + 1 players. If no link be-
tween the α-component and the β -component is formed or
an α-player and a β -player do not move to the β -component
and the α-component, respectively, the network with both
of the α-component and the β -component can be an equi-
librium.
When a link between an α-player and a β -player is formed,
the upper limit of the utility variation of the β -player is
mu(β ,α)− c−(m−1)d(2) , (34)
and it occurs when the α-component is star shaped. Be-
cause (34) is negative if u(β ,α) = e < d(2), then such
a link is not formed. When a β -player changes her action
to α , the upper limit of the utility of the β -player is
2Lu(α,β )−2c−2
L
∑
k=1
d(k)+ mu(α,α)−c−(m−1)d(2) .
(35)
From u(α,β ) = f < e, the sum of the first, the second,
and the third terms of (35) is negative if e < d(2),
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and then if L is sufficiently large compared with m,
(35) can be negative. Therefore, under the above situation,
no link between an α-component and a β -component is
formed.
Next, consider the case where an α-player moves into the
β -component after the α-player changes his action to β , or
a β -player moves into the α-component after the β -player
changes her action to α . In the former case, it results in
decrease of the utility of a β -player originally included in
the β -component. Conversely in the latter case, the util-
ity of an α-player originally included in the α-component
increases. After the β -player changes her action from β
to α , the utility variation of the β -player is
2
(
Lb−
(
c +
L
∑
k=1
d(k)
))
−(ma− c−(m−1)d(2)) , (36)
and if (36) is nonnegative, the β -player does not have any
incentive to migrate to the α-component. In order for (36)
to be nonnegative, a ≤ Lb− (c + ∑Lk=3 d(k)) must be sat-
isfied, and it holds if L is sufficiently large and b > d(L).
The condition of ring shaped components in Lemma 2 is
compatible with b > d(L), and therefore if L is sufficiently
large, (36) can be nonnegative.
From the facts shown above, the network with both of
the α-component and the β -component can be an equi-
librium.
Proof of (3): From a < c, forming a new link results in
decrease of the utility of a player, i.e., u(ai,a j)− c < 0
and u(a j,ai)−c < 0, and therefore an empty network is an
equilibrium.
As for nonempty networks, from Lemma 1, all the play-
ers in an equilibrium component choose the same action:
α or β . For x = α , from Lemma 4, if there exists an integer
l = la satisfying condition (6), there exists an equilibrium
network with an α-component. Similarly, for x = β , if there
exists an integer l = lb satisfying condition (6), there exists
an equilibrium network with a β -component.
When c < d(2), the right hand side of condition (6) is nega-
tive, and then an equilibrium network does not include any
component. Namely, an equilibrium network is an empty
network, because there does not exist an integer l satisfying
condition (6). If there exists an integer l satisfying condi-
tion (6), d(2)≤ c≤RC(2l) must hold. However, because of
2l+1≤ n, d(2)≤ c≤RC(2l) implies d(2)≤ c≤RC(n−1),
and therefore when d(2)≤ c and c > RC(n−1), there does
not exist such an integer l. Then, an equilibrium network
does not include any component. On the contrary, when
d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(n− 1), because this condition is compati-
ble with d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(2l), it is possible that there exists
a nonempty equilibrium network.
For the coexistence of an α-component and a β -component
in the case of d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(2l), in a way similar to that
of (2), it is shown that a link between the α-component
and the β -component is not formed if u(β ,α) < d(2).
Because of b < a < c, migration from one component to
the other one results in decrease of the utility of a player
as shown in the proof of (2). Thus, the network with
the α-component and the β -component can be an equilib-
rium.

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